July 4, 2008

The new normal

The (only) good thing about a war is you can tell when it's over.

The problem with the "War on Terror" is that terrorism is always with us, as Liberty's director, Shami Chakrabarti, said yesterday at the Homeland and Border Security 08 conference. "I do think the threat is very serious. But I don't think it can be addressed by a war." Because, "We, the people, will not be able to verify a discernible end."

The idea that "we are at war" has justified so much post 9/11 legislation, from the ID card (in the UK) and Real ID (US) to the continued expansion of police powers.

How long can you live in a state of emergency before emergency becomes the new normal? If there is no end, when do you withdraw the latitude wartime gives a government?

Several of yesterday's speakers talked about preserving "our way of life" while countering the threat with better security. But "our way of life" is a moving target.

For example, Baroness Pauline Neville-Jones, the shadow security minister, talked about the importance of controlling the UK's borders. "Perimeter security is absolutely basic." Her example: you can't go into a building without having your identity checked. But it's not so long ago - within the 18 years I've been living in London - that you could do exactly that, even sometimes in central London. In New York, of course, until 9/11, everything was wide open; these days midtown Manhattan makes you wait in front of barriers while you're photographed, checked, and treated with great suspicion if the person you're visiting doesn't answer the phone.

Only seven years ago, flying did not involve two hours of standing in line. Until January, tourists do not have to register three days before flying to the US for pre-screening.

It's not clear how much would change with a Conservative government. "There is a very great deal by this government we would continue," said Neville-Jones. But, she said, besides trackling threats, whether motivated (terrorists) or not (floods, earthquakes, "we are also at any given moment in the game of deciding what kind of society we want to have and what values we want to preserve." She wants "sustainable security, predicated on protecting people's freedom and ensuring they have more, not less, control over their lives." And, she said, "While we need protective mechanisms, the surveillance society is not the route down which we should go. It is absolutely fundamental that security and freedom lie together as an objective."

To be sure, Neville-Jones took issue with some of the present government's plans - the Conservatives would not, she said, go ahead with the National Identity Register, and they favour "a more coherent and wide-ranging border security force". The latter would mean bringing together many currently disparate agencies to create a single border strategy. The Conservatives also favour establishing a small "homeland command for the armed forces" within the UK because, "The qualities of the military and the resources they can bring to complex situations are important and useful." At the moment, she said, "We have to make do with whoever happens to be in the country."

OK. So take the four core elements of the national security strategy according to Admiral Lord Alan West, a Parliamentary under-secretary of state at the Home Office: pursue, protect, prepare, and prevent. "Prevent" is the one that all this is about. If we are in wartime, and we know that any measure that's brought in is only temporary, our tolerance for measures that violate the normal principles of democracy is higher.

Are the Olympics wartime? Security is already in the planning stages, although, as Tarique Ghaffur pointed out, the Games are one of several big events in 2012. And some events like sailing and Olympic football will be outside London, as will 600 training camps. Add in the torch relay, and it's national security.

And in that case, we should be watching very closely what gets brought in for the Olympics, because alongside the physical infrastructure that the Games always leave behind - the stadia and transport - may be a security infrastructure that we wouldn't necessarily have chosen for daily life.

As if the proposals in front of us aren't bad enough. Take for example, the clause of the counterterrorism bill (due for its second reading in the Lords next week) that would allow the authorities to detain suspects for up to 42 days without charge. Chakrabarti lamented the debate over this, which has turned into big media politics.

"The big frustration," she said, "is that alternatives created by sensible, proportionate means of early intervention are being ignored." Instead, she suggested, make the data legally collected by surveillance and interception admissible in fair criminal trials. Charge people with precursor terror offenses so they are properly remanded in custody and continue the investigation for the more serious plot. "That is a way of complying with ancient principles that you should know what you are accused of before being banged up, but it gives the police the time and powers they need."

Not being at war gives us the time to think. We should take it.

Wendy M. Grossman's Web site has an extensive archive of her books, articles, and music, and an archive of all the earlier columns in this series. Readers are welcome to post here, at net.wars home, at her personal blog, or by email to netwars@skeptic.demon.co.uk (but please turn off HTML).

June 27, 2008

Mistakes were made

This week we got the detail on what went wrong at Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs that led to the loss of those two CDs full of the personal details of 25 million British households last year with the release of the Poynter Review (PDF). We also got a hint of how and whether the future might be different with the publication yesterday of Data Handling: Proecures in Government (PDF), written by Sir Gus O'Donnell and commissioned by the Prime Minister after the HMRC loss. The most obvious message of both reports: government needs to secure data better.

The nicest thing the Poynter review said was that HMRC has already made changes in response to its criticisms. Otherwise, it was pretty much a surgical demonstration of "institutional deficiencies".

The chief points:


- Security was not HMRC's top priority.

- HMRC in fact had the technical ability to send only the selection of data that NAO actually needed, but the staff involved didn't know it.

- There was no designated single point of contact between HMRC and NAO.

- HMRC used insecure methods for data storage and transfer.

- The decision to send the CDs to the NAO was taken by junior staff without consulting senior managers - which under HMRC's own rules they should have done.

- The reason HMRC's junior staff did not consult managers was that they believed (wrongly) that NAO had absolute authority to access any and all information HMRC had.

- The HMRC staffer who dispatched the discs incorrectly believed the TNT Post service was secure and traceable, as required by HMRC policy. A different TNT service that met those requirements was in fact available.

- HMRC policies regarding information security and the release of data were not communicated sufficiently through the organization and were not sufficiently detailed.

- HMRC failed on accountability, governance, information security...you name it.

The real problem, though, isn't any single one of these things. If junior staff had consulted senior staff, it might not have mattered that they didn't know what the policies were. If HMRC used proper information security and secure methods for data storage (that is, encryption rather than simple password protection), they wouldn't have had access to send the discs. If they'd understood TNT's services correctly, the discs wouldn't have gotten lost - or at least been traceable if they had.

The real problem was the interlocking effect of all these factors. That, as Nassim Nicholas Taleb might say, was the black swan.

For those who haven't read Taleb's The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable, the black swan stands for the event that is completely unpredictable - because, like black swans until one was spotted in Australia, no such thing has ever been seen - until it happens. Of course, data loss is pretty much a white swan; we've seen lots of data breaches. The black swan, really, is the perfectly secure system that is still sufficiently open for the people who need to use it.

That challenge is what O'Donnell's report on data handling is about and, as he notes, it's going to get harder rather than easier. He recommends a complete rearrangement of how departments manage information as well as improving the systems within individual departments. He also recommends greater openness about how the government secures data.

"No organisation can guarantee it will never lose data," he writes, "and the Government is no exception." O'Donnell goes on to consider how data should be protected and managed, not whether it should be collected or shared in the first place. That job is being left for yet another report in progress, due soon.

It's good to read that some good is coming out of the HMRC data loss: all departments are, according to the O'Donnell report, reviewing their data practices and beginning the process of cultural change. That can only be a good thing.

But the underlying problem is outside the scope of these reports, and it's this government's fondness for creating giant databases: the National Identity Register, ContactPoint, the DNA database, and so on. If the government really accepted the principle that it is impossible to guarantee complete data security, what would they do? Logically, they ought to start by cancelling the data behemoths on the understanding that it's a bad idea to base public policy on the idea that you can will a black swan into existence.

It would make more sense to create a design for government use of data that assumes there will be data breaches and attempts to limit the adverse consequences for the individuals whose data is lost. If my privacy is compromised alongside 50 million other people's and I am the victim of identity theft does it help me that the government department that lost the data knows which staff member to blame?

As Agatha Christie said long ago in one of her 80-plus books, "I know to err is human, but human error is nothing compared to what a computer can do if it tries." The man-machine combination is even worse. We should stop trying to breed black swans and instead devise systems that don't create so many white ones.

Wendy M. Grossman's Web site has an extensive archive of her books, articles, and music, and an archive of all the earlier columns in this series. Readers are welcome to post here, at net.wars home, at her personal blog, or by email to netwars@skeptic.demon.co.uk (but please turn off HTML).

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